

ORGANISED CRIME

HACKTIVIST





LUGANO

INSIDER

of data

—

V

5

50

WHO: Disgruntled employees, contractors, whistleblowers. OBJECTIVES: Score settling, leaks, money, "rights from wrongs" TARGETS: Large companies, banking sector and service related companies. SIGNATURE: Confidential ducuments support thefts (CD, Hard Drive, Paper) CLASSIC CASE: Bradley Birkenfeld awarded 104 millions \$ forwhistle blowing against UBS, Hervé Fallciani / HSBC

TARGETS: Banks and industry service related sectors, insurance, NGO.

SIGNATURE: Corruption of low / mid level employees, thefts of computers, hijacking

CLASSIC CASE: Purchase of old computers and Xerox machines to extract the data



LD WAYvs NEW WAY **OF VIEWING DATA THEFT**

NEW WAY

TY THEFT.

BREACHES.

PRISES WORLDWIDE.

SONAL IDENTITY THEFT.

OLD WAY

"THIS WILL NEVER HAPPEN TO US."

DISORGANIZED, AMATEURISH HACKERS WORKING OUT OF THEIR HOMES, DOING IT FOR "FUN" RATHER THAN MONEY.

"THIS IS AN IT ISSUE."

NEGLIGIBLE IMPACT ON CUSTOMERS, EMPLOYEES, AND COMPANY COSTS.

"WE TRUST OUR EMPLOYEES TO SECURE OUR INFORMATION."

RISK EXPOSURES ARE SMALL AND MAN-AGEABLE.




PATA LEAN

THE MOST SENSITIVE TIME FOR INFORMATION THEFT IS WHEN AN EMPLOYEE LEAVES THE COMPANY.

OF WORKERS SURVEYED HAVE ADMITTED TO STEALING CONFIDENTIAL CORPORATE **INFORMATION** ON AT LEAST ONE OCCASION.

FOR EMPLOYEES WHO TAKE CUSTOMER DATA WITH THEM AFTER THEY LEAVE, **CUSTOMER DATA AND INTERNAL DATABASES ARE** THE PRIMARY TARGETS 51% OF THE TIME.



K A T A N A

DIGITAL

HACKTIVIST WHO: Anonymous, Antisec, ATAC, LulzSec

TARGETS: Corporations, governements SIGNATURE: Leaking sensitive information, public shaming, creepy youtube videos. CLASSIC CASE: Hacking Paypal website, Visa, Mastercard

OBJECTIVES: Righting perceived wrongs, publicity, protecting internet freedoms

WHO: France, Germany, US, China OBJECTIVES: Name and list of Tax payers, Intellectual Property TARGETS: Banks and industry service related. Industrial espionage SIGNATURE: Infiltration, press pressure, legitimization of illegal acts CLASSIC CASE: France purchasing HSBC CD from Hervé Fallciani. Germany openly offering \$\$\$ rewards for any stolen information leading to tax recoveries.

and create profiles. GOVERNMENT

"WE PASSED OUR AUDIT, SO WE'RE SAFE."

EMPLOYEES AND COLLABORATION NETWORKS ARE THE MOST COMMON DATA LEAK SOURCES.

RISKS ARE SUBSTANTIAL, INCLUDING COM-**PROMISE OF COMPANY IT SYSTEMS, CUSTOM-**ER LAWSUITS, EROSION OF BRAND REPUTA-TION, LOSS OF CUSTOMERS, GOVERNMENT FINES, AND NEW REGULATION.

COMPANIES OF ALL SIZES AND ACROSS ALL

INDUSTRIES CONFRONT A REAL, GROWING,

AND STRATEGIC RISK FROM DATA AND IDENTI-

THEFT IS A LUCRATIVE BUSINESS FOR SO-

PHISTICATED, ORGANIZED CRIMINAL ENTER-

DATA LOSS COMMONLY OCCURS THROUGH

PHYSICAL LOSS, DATA EXCHANGES, FRAUD,

AND HUMAN ERROR, RATHER THAN JUST IT

LOSS OF PERSONAL DATA LEAVES CUSTOMERS

AND EMPLOYEES AT RISK OF FRAUD AND PER-


DATA PROTECTION IS A CEO-LEVEL CONCERN.

OF THOSE SURVEYED SAID THAT STOLEN INTERNAL CORPORATE DATA COULD BE • HELPFUL IN THEIR FUTURE CAREERS.









LONG DISTANCES **MULTIPLE STOPS**

CONCLUSION

WHILE SEEKING AN OUTSOURCING SOLUTION FOR THE DESTRUCTION OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION, WHETHER IN THE FORM OF IT SUPPORT SUCH AS HARD DRIVES OR PAPER SOURCES, THE WHOLE SYSTEM AND PROCESS SHOULD BE ANALYZED RATHER THAN ONLY THE FINAL OUTCOME.

SERVERS

AS WE CAN SEE FROM THE ABOVE INFOGRAPHICS, RISKS CAN OCCUR ALL ALONG THE PROCESS. THIS IS WHY IT IS CRUCIAL TO LIMIT TRANSPORT AND DESTRUCTION RELATED TASKS. PHYSICAL CONFIDENTIAL ON-SITE DESTRUCTION ALLOWS FOR ALL THE ADVAN-TAGES OF OUTSOURCING WITHOUT THE RISKS!

> **PWC 10 minutes – Information for destruction theft** Fortune magazine – Who are the hackers **PWC** – Key findings from the global state of information security, survey 2013 Ponemon institute **RTS** documentaire sur vol de copieurs Tribune de Genève du 23.2.2013 Admin.ch statistiques sur vol de véhicule